This paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts an allocation to be belief-neutral e¢ cient (ine¢ cient) if it is e¢ cient (ine¢ cient) under any convex combination of agents'beliefs. While this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations, it can identify positive-and negative-sum speculation driven by con ‡icting beliefs in a broad range of prominent models.
Introduction
The burgeoning behavioral …nance and economics literature has identi…ed a set of psychological biases that distort people's beliefs and decisions in various economic situations. 1 The presence of belief distortions stimulates normative analysis of welfare consequences of belief distortions. A standard approach taken by the literature is to assume that the social planner knows the objective belief measure and uses the objective measure to evaluate agents'
welfare. 2 This approach, however, faces a major challenge in implementation-which belief should the planner use? In many realistic situations, the planner does not observe the objective belief and faces the same di¢ culty as individuals in discriminating di¤erent beliefs based on available data. Perhaps due to this challenge, many studies in the behavioral literature shy away from making any normative statement.
This paper proposes a belief-neutral welfare criterion, which requires the planner to be sure of the presence of belief distortions by some agents but without having to precisely identify the objective belief. To illustrate the basic idea, we …rst consider a bet between Joe
Stiglitz and Bob Wilson. 3 One day, Joe and Bob argued over the contents of a pillow. Joe maintained that the pillow had a natural …lling, while Bob thought a polyester …lling was more likely. Joe assessed with probability 0:9 that the pillow had natural down and Bob assessed the probability at 0:1. They decided to construct a bet as follows: If the pillow had natural down Bob would pay Joe $100, but if it had arti…cial down, Joe would pay Bob $100. They could only discover the truth by cutting the pillow open, which would destroy it. They agreed that the winner would replace the pillow at a cost of $50. 4 It is clear that both Joe and Bob preferred the bet relative to no betting at all, as each expected to make a net pro…t of $35 after deducting the cost of replacing the pillow. This bet was desirable from each individual's perspective, and thus it Pareto dominated no betting under the standard Pareto principle. However, the outcome of the bet was worrisome-it led to a wealth transfer between Joe and Bob and a perfectly good pillow's being destroyed.
Joe and Bob might have taken the bet for its entertainment value, which could have 1 See Hirshleifer (2001) , Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Della Vigna (2009) for extensive reviews of the literature.
2 For example, see Weyl (2007) , Sandroni and Squintani (2007) , Spinnewijn (2010) , Hassan and Mertens (2011), Gennaioli, Shleifer, Vishny (2011) , Bianchi, Boz, and Mendoza (2012) . 3 See Kreps (2012, page 193) for more details of the story. 4 We can also make the example more realistic by making the replacement cost of the pillow to be state dependent, i.e., the cost being $50 if it had natural down and $20 if it had arti…cial down. Our welfare analysis of the bet is robust to such a state dependent replacement cost.
justi…ed the cost of destroying the pillow. Another possible motive was that each of them believed he would win and the other would lose. A planner could simply verify the reason by asking them. If the bet was motivated by a belief in winning, then at least one of them was overcon…dent, even though it was still di¢ cult to tell who was overcon…dent. In this case, it is immediately obvious that the bet was a negative-sum game regardless of whose belief the planner uses to evaluate the social welfare. The resulting social loss is exactly the destroyed pillow. In fact, the con ‡icting beliefs of Joe and Bob induced a form of externality. Despite knowing the bet would lead to the pillow's being destroyed, each believed that he would win and the other party would lose an amount even greater than his own gain. Interestingly, while obvious in this example, these types of externalities are also present in a broad range of prominent models with heterogeneously distorted beliefs. The presence of such externalities motivates our welfare criterion.
To generalize the key insight of this example, we acknowledge the relevance of a set of reasonable beliefs and require e¢ ciency to be robust across all of the reasonable beliefs. Our welfare criterion asserts a social choice to be belief-neutral (in)e¢ cient if and only if it is (in)e¢ cient under every reasonable belief. A key presumption of this criterion is that the planner is sure that some agents' beliefs are distorted. 5 Speci…cally, we accept all convex combinations of agents'beliefs as reasonable beliefs and propose to use all of them to extend the two standard welfare analysis approaches-the expected social welfare approach and the Pareto e¢ ciency approach. In implementing our welfare criterion, we strictly interpret agents'beliefs as their views of likelihood of economic outcomes, and incorporate all other aspects such as agents' risk-seeking preferences and preference-driven di¤erences in prior beliefs (a la Savage (1954) and Morris (1995) ) by appropriate choice of their (state dependent) utility functions.
The expected social welfare approach directly compares two social allocations x and y for a given welfare function. Our welfare criterion posits that y is belief-neutral inferior to x if the expected total welfare from y is lower than that from x under every convex combination of the agents'beliefs. Back to the bet between Joe and Bob. Suppose that the planner is sure that the bet was induced by belief distortions and that Joe and Bob were both risk neutral. If the social planner assigns Joe and Bob equal weight in summing up their utilities in the social welfare function, it is clear that the bet is belief-neutral inferior to the status quo (no betting). This is because regardless of which reasonable belief the social planner adopts to evaluate Joe's and Bob's expected utilities, the transfer of $100 between them has no impact on the expected social welfare, but destroying the pillow leads to a sure social loss of $50.
Without relying on a particular social welfare function, we can also adopt the Pareto dominance approach. Our criterion asserts that an allocation y is belief-neutral Pareto ine¢ cient if under every reasonable belief, there exists an alternative allocation y 0 that improves the expected utilities of some agents without hurting anyone else. Returning to the example, suppose that the planner adopts Joe's belief. Under this belief, the bet leads to an expected wealth transfer of $80 from Bob to Joe and the pillow's destruction. Alternatively, a direct transfer of $80 from Bob to Joe without the bet improves everyone's expected utility by saving them the cost of replacing the pillow. Similarly, under every convex combination of Joe's and Bob's beliefs, the planner can …nd a suitable (belief-measure dependent) transfer without the bet to strictly improve everyone's expected utility. Thus, the bet is belief-neutral ine¢ cient with respect to any social welfare function that increases with agents'utilities.
In summary, without taking a stand on which belief was correct, the planner can categorically determine that the bet leads to an ine¢ cient social outcome. The key is that the externality induced by the con ‡icting beliefs of Joe and Bob is uniformly negative under every reasonable belief. Of course, this feature may not always hold in a more general situation. For illustration, let us extend the bet. Suppose that Bob believed the pillow contained poisonous materials (instead of polyester) with 90% probability and that turning in a poisonous pillow to the authorities would lead to an additional reward of $100 to the winner of the bet (instead of the $50 cost of replacing the pillow). The bet had a positive sum under Bob's belief but still a negative sum under Joe's belief. Thus, it is neither belief-neutral e¢ cient nor belief-neutral ine¢ cient.
Despite its incompleteness, Section 3 shows that our belief-neutral criterion is nevertheless able to identify positive or negative externalities in a set of examples based on simpli…ed versions of prominent models with heterogeneously distorted beliefs in the literature. As these examples tend to be one sided, they serve to demonstrate the capacity of the criterion rather than to advocate any particular policy recommendation.
Our …rst two examples involve speculative bubbles. A number of recent studies (e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978) , Morris (1996) , Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , Wu and Guo (2004) , Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) , and Hong and Sraer (2011) ) emphasize that the option to resell assets to future optimists can induce bubbles in asset prices. Our …rst example highlights how overinvestment induced by price bubbles makes speculative trading a negative-sum game just like the bet between Joe and Bob (e.g., Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) , Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) , and Panageas (2006)). Our second example highlights that bubbles caused by heterogenous beliefs can help overcome market breakdowns induced by the adverse selection problem in lemons models (as in Akerlof (1970)), and thus lead to a positive-sum game. Our criterion can also identify the consequent belief-neutral welfare gains.
Our third example builds on leverage cycles caused by heterogeneous beliefs (e.g., Geanakoplos (2003 ), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008 , Simsek (2012) , Cao (2010) , and He and Xiong (2012) ). In these models, binding collateral constraints force optimistic asset owners to liquidate positions. The liquidation costs associated with forced selling make the initial leveraged asset acquisition a negative-sum game. Again, our criterion provides a tool to analyze welfare implications and thus regulatory implications of such leverage cycles.
The fourth example concerns excessive risk taking induced by agents'heterogeneous beliefs in general equilibrium models of asset markets (e.g., Detemple and Murthy (1994) , Kurz (1996) , Zapatero (1998) , Basak (2000) , Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) , Jouini and Napp (2007) , David (2008) , Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), Xiong and Yan (2010) , and Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela (2011)). By making agents' consumption more volatile than their endowments, the trading induced by heterogeneous beliefs is a negative-sum game in expected utility terms regardless of the belief the planner uses to evaluate agents'expected utilities. Of course, in more general settings, some trading allows agents with risky endowment streams to share endowment risks. In that case, there is a trade-o¤ between the welfare gain from risk sharing and the welfare loss from speculative trading (e.g., Kubler
and Schmedders (2011), Simsek (2011), and Posner and Weyl (2012) ). Our criterion provides a tool to analyze such a trade-o¤, which is particularly relevant in the ongoing debate regarding the role of …nancial innovation in facilitating hedging and speculation.
The last example illustrates consumption/savings distortions induced by heterogeneous beliefs in macroeconomic models, e.g., Sims (2008) . In production-economy settings, trading between them not only makes their consumption excessively volatile, but also induces them to save either too much or too little relative to homogeneous-economy benchmarks. The consequent distortion in aggregate investment also leads to a negative-sum game, which our criterion can identify.
Economists have long recognized that the standard Pareto criterion can lead to unappealing outcomes when agents hold con ‡icting beliefs. Early general equilibrium literature, e.g., von Weizsäcker (1962) , Dreze (1970) , Starr (1973) , Harris (1978) , Hammond (1981) , noted that an allocation that is Pareto optimal in the usual sense might feature less-than-perfect risk sharing, and, in particular, made a distinction between ex ante e¢ ciency and various versions of ex post e¢ ciency (with better risk-sharing properties). The independent decision theory literature, e.g., Mongin (1997) , Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2004) , and Gilboa, Samuelson, and Schmeidler (2012) , has also pointed out that the standard Pareto principle can be spurious when agents hold con ‡icting beliefs. Our contribution to these studies is to propose a belief-neutral criterion, which circumvents the spurious unanimity problem of the standard Pareto criterion under the premise that the planner is aware of the presence of belief distortions but unaware of the objective belief.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the welfare criterion in a generic setting. Section 3 provides a series of examples to demonstrate the capability of the criterion to generate clear welfare ranking in popular models with distorted beliefs. We conclude in Section 4. The technical proofs are provided in the Appendix.
The Welfare Criterion
We introduce the welfare criterion in a generic setting with T periods and T + 1 dates: t = 0; 1; :::; T: The evolution of the state of the economy is represented by a binomial-tree process: fs t g T t=0 . In each period, the state variable can either increase or decrease by a discrete level. The tree is recombining and can take t + 1 possible values on date t.
There are N agents, indexed by i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g : On each date, each agent holds a belief about the probability of the tree's increasing in the following period, which we denote by i t;s , where t is the date and s is a state on the date. As this belief can vary across dates and states, we summarize agent i's beliefs by i = i t;s . We restrict the agent's belief in each period and each state to be strictly positive: i t;s > 0. One can determine the agent's probability assessments of all future states from i .
Suppose that the agents consume only on the …nal date T . A social choice x represents a set of consumption allocations to the agents across the …nal states s T : x = fx i T (s T )g : A feasible allocation satis…es the aggregate budget constraint in each …nal state.
Suppose that agent i has state-dependent utility function
, which is strictly increasing and locally concave with respect to consumption. This utility speci…cation is su¢ ciently general to capture the standard utility functions used in most economic models and, as we will discuss later, to accommodate di¤erences in agents'preference-driven prior beliefs. Based on the utility speci…cation and the agent's beliefs, his expected utility at
, where the superscript i denotes the expectation under agent i's beliefs. By building on expected utilities, our framework ignores preferences that feature ambiguity aversion.
Heterogeneous Beliefs
We let agents hold di¤erent beliefs (i.e., i 6 = i 0 if i 6 = i 0 ) and assume the beliefs are common knowledge among the agents. Before we dive into welfare analysis, it is useful to sort out di¤erent sources of heterogeneous beliefs. Throughout our later analysis, we treat agents'beliefs as given. It is straightforward to think of the beliefs as outcomes of the agents' learning processes. Suppose that an unobservable variable determines the probability of the tree's moving up each period. Each agent has a prior belief about the distribution of , observes some information about in each period, and uses Bayes'rule to update his belief about . Through this learning process, three sources may lead to heterogeneous beliefs among agents: 1) distortions in updating; 2) di¤erent information; and 3) di¤erent prior beliefs.
We emphasize distortions in updating as a key source of heterogeneous beliefs. The presence of belief distortions prompts welfare concerns. Some agents may be unaware of their belief distortions and, as a result, take actions that hurt their own and others' welfare. Thus, it is important that a social planner evaluates each agent's welfare by using the objective probability measure, which serves as the premise of our welfare criterion.
A second source of belief di¤erences is asymmetric information. The well-known no-trade theorem (e.g., Aumann (1976), Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) ) shows that asymmetric information can cause rational agents with a common prior belief neither to hold common knowledge heterogeneous beliefs nor to trade with each other.
This result motivates us to mostly ignore asymmetric information in our analysis, except in our example considered in Section 3.2.
A third source of belief di¤erences is heterogeneous prior beliefs. The decision theory literature that builds on Savage's (1954) notion of subjective probability treats beliefs separately for individual agents. As economics does not o¤er much guidance on how individuals form their prior beliefs, economists tend to agree that prior beliefs probably depend on an individual's background and experience. Morris (1995) 
for agent i. Suppose the social planner holds a probability measure of his own, which we denote by SP . We can rewrite agent i's expected utility as
is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of agent i's probability measure with respect to the social planner's measure. The product
acts as the agent's e¤ec-tive utility under the social planner's probability measure. Thus, one can always incorporate agents'preference-driven heterogeneous prior beliefs via their state-dependent utility functions. In the rest of the paper, we treat agents' heterogeneous beliefs as caused by their distorted beliefs, assuming that any heterogeneity in their priors has already been moved into their utility functions. 
Welfare Analysis with Distorted Beliefs
In the presence of distorted beliefs, it is important that the social planner uses an objective probability measure to evaluate agents'expected utilities in the welfare analysis. The challenge here is that the social planner may not observe the probability that drives economic uncertainty in the economy. Given the agents'di¤erent belief measures, whose measure is appropriate for welfare analysis? Is there an even more appropriate one outside of those used by the agents? We now introduce a belief-neutral welfare criterion.
Without taking a stand on which agent's beliefs are correct, we allow the planner to consider every belief from a set of reasonable beliefs. This set contains all convex combinations of the agents' beliefs. Denote h to be a convex combination of the agents' beliefs with weight h = h 1 ; :::; h N :
The space spanned by h is su¢ ciently large to include all of the extreme beliefs held by any agent in a given environment. As illustrated by the examples in the next section, this set includes the beliefs of the optimists who bid up asset prices and who take highly leveraged positions, as well beliefs of pessimists who are constrained by short-sales restrictions from directly participating in asset markets.
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The key contribution of our welfare criterion is that it allows for analysis of the e¢ ciency of a social allocation according to all reasonable beliefs. Speci…cally, we propose to identify an allocation as ine¢ cient (or e¢ cient) if the social planner …nds it ine¢ cient (or e¢ cient)
under every reasonable probability measure h that is commonly used to evaluate all agents' expected utilities. We can use two di¤erent approaches to implement our proposal, one based on a given social welfare function and the other through the notion of Pareto e¢ ciency.
As well known in standard economic theory, in the absence of belief distortions these two approaches are internally consistent, as any Pareto e¢ cient social allocation corresponds to an optimal allocation that maximizes the agents'aggregate expected utilities under a set of nonnegative weights.
assumptions about their state preferences, or by simply asking them (e.g., using survey evidence). One could then rely on the evidence on psychological biases to interpret belief disagreements in particular contexts as representing distortions as opposed to heterogeneous priors. 8 It shall become clear later that one can extend the set of reasonable beliefs to include any measure that assigns non-zero probability to all relevant states in endowment-economy settings.
Expected Social Welfare
The Bergsonian social welfare function is a sum of agents'expected utilities E h 0 [u i ] (calculated according to a common measure h ) based on a set of nonnegative weights f i g:
If the weights are all equal, it becomes the utilitarian social welfare function:
Based on a given welfare function, we can implement our criterion as follows.
De…nition 1 Consider two social allocations, x and y. If the expected social welfare of allocation x dominates that of allocation y for every reasonable probability measure h ,
with the inequality holding strictly for at least one reasonable measure, then allocation x is belief-neutral superior to allocation y:
To establish the superiority of one social allocation relative to another, a higher expected social welfare according to every convex combination of the agents'beliefs is required. This proposed belief-neutral superiority is a partial ordering of social allocations. In the case of two social allocations x and y; x might dominate y in one measure and y might dominate x in another measure. In such cases, we would say that x and y are incomparable.
Despite its incompleteness, this criterion is nevertheless useful in detecting negative-sum speculation driven by distorted beliefs. We now apply this criterion to analyze the bet between Joe and Bob described in the introduction. Suppose that both Joe and Bob are risk neutral: u Joe (w) = w and u Bob (w) = w, and that the social planner uses the utilitarian social welfare function for a reasonable belief:
9 Given that these social welfare functions are linear and that the social planner uses the same probability measure to evaluate the expected utilities of all agents, the expected social welfare is independent of the order of aggregating welfare and computing expectations. In our analysis, we …nd it more convenient to …rst aggregate agents'welfare in each of the …nal states and then compare the expected social welfare under di¤erent probability measures.
It is obvious that without any betting, regardless of the probability measure the social planner adopts, the social welfare is simply the sum of Joe's and Bob's initial wealth. The bet causes a transfer of $100 between them and the pillow's destruction. The money transfer has no impact on the social welfare regardless of its direction or the probability measure the social planner adopts to evaluate the welfare. However, replacing the pillow incurs a sure cost of $50 and therefore makes the bet a negative-sum game for every reasonable, common probability measure used to evaluate Joe's and Bob's expected utilities. Thus, the status quo allocation is belief neutral superior to the bet.
The utilitarian social welfare function assigns equal weights to all agents. If the social welfare function puts a su¢ ciently high weight on one agent, say Joe, then we cannot directly compare the two allocations, x and y. This is because under Joe's belief the bet increases his own expected utility and thus the social welfare relative to the status quo allocation.
However, this may not be the case under Bob's belief. The second version of our criterion addresses this concern by generalizing the notion of Pareto e¢ ciency, and establishes that the bet is belief-neutral ine¢ cient regardless of the choice of the social welfare function.
Pareto E¢ ciency
The essence of Pareto e¢ ciency is to determine whether there exists an alternative feasible allocation that improves the welfare (i.e., expected utility) of some agents without hurting any other agent. If such an alternative exists, the allocation under evaluation is Pareto ine¢ cient. We next generalize this logic to environments with distorted beliefs to obtain a second implementation of our criterion.
De…nition 2 Consider a social allocation y. Suppose that for every reasonable probability measure h , there exists another (measure dependent) allocation y 0 such that it improves some agents' expected utilities without reducing anyone's, i.e., 8i;
with the inequality holding strictly for at least one agent. Then, allocation y is belief-neutral Pareto ine¢ cient. In contrast, if for every h , there does not exist a dominating alternative, then allocation y is belief-neutral Pareto e¢ cient.
If agents have common beliefs, i.e., if i is the same for each i, then the belief-neutral
Pareto criterion coincides with the usual Pareto criterion. In the presence of distorted beliefs, as we discussed before, the social planner uses a common probability measure from the set of reasonable measures to evaluate each agent's expected utility. The belief-neutral criterion then identi…es an allocation as ine¢ cient (or e¢ cient) if it is Pareto ine¢ cient (or e¢ cient) under every reasonable measure.
Returning again to the bet between Joe and Bob, we can show that the betting allocation, It is also easy to see that the status quo allocation is belief-neutral e¢ cient, as for every reasonable belief the planner cannot …nd a transfer to improve Joe's or Bob's welfare without hurting the other's. Taken together, the status quo allocation is on the belief-neutral Pareto e¢ cient frontier while the betting allocation is in the belief-neutral ine¢ cient set. Proposition 1 Let X denote the set of all feasible allocations. Then, an allocation, x 2 X, is belief-neutral Pareto e¢ cient (ine¢ cient) if and only if for every reasonable probability measure h ; there exists (does not exist) a set of Pareto weights f i g (with i 0 for all i and P i i = 1) such that:
Proposition 1 illustrates the relationship between the two versions of our criterion. Both versions consider all reasonable beliefs (i.e., convex combinations of agents'beliefs), which is the key characteristic of our approach. However, the welfare-function-based criterion …xes 10 Note that the alternative allocation y 0 that dominates the betting allocation is belief dependent. In other words, the planner needs to identify the objective belief in order to choose a speci…c transfer to improve upon the betting allocation. However, since the status quo allocation is on the belief-neutral Pareto e¢ cient frontier while the betting allocation is in the belief-neutral ine¢ cient set, this indirect comparison nevertheless suggests that the status quo might be preferred to the betting allocation.
a particular social welfare function (e.g., a particular set of Pareto weights). By doing so, it enables us to compare allocations directly, e.g., to say that the status quo allocation, x, is belief-neutral superior to the betting allocation, y. In contrast, the Pareto e¢ ciency version is more general because it considers not only all reasonable beliefs, but also all social welfare functions (e.g., all possible Pareto weights). The cost of this generality is that the criterion does not provide direct comparisons between two allocations. Rather, it categorizes allocations into three sets: 1) those that are belief-neutral ine¢ cient because they are inferior under every reasonable belief and every welfare function; 2) those that are belief-neutral e¢ cient because under every reasonable belief they are superior at least according to one welfare function; and 3) those that are neither uniformly e¢ cient nor uniformly ine¢ cient across all reasonable beliefs.
Comments on the Criterion 2.3.1 Incompleteness
Our belief-neutral criterion requires the externality induced by agents' con ‡icting beliefs to be uniformly positive or negative across the set of reasonable beliefs. This requirement is demanding and may lead to incomplete ranking in some situations. To illustrate such incompleteness, we will extend the bet between Joe and Bob. Suppose that Joe believed that the pillow was made of cotton with 90% probability as before while Bob believed that the pillow contained poisonous materials with 90% probability. Again, they had to cut open the pillow to …nd out its content. If Joe was right, he would win $100 from Bob and pay $50 to replace the pillow. If Bob was right, he would win $100 from Joe and in addition receive $100 from the authority as a reward for removing a poisonous pillow from the public. criterion instructs the planner to choose a belief-neutral e¢ cient allocation if it exists, avoid a belief-neutral ine¢ cient allocation if there is any, and otherwise avoid any market intervention.
Individual Behavior
Our criterion might be reminiscent of Bewley (2002) . In Bewley (2002) an individual decision maker holds several belief distributions and only overcomes inertia if the new choice dominates the status quo under all belief distributions. Bewley's theory shares our feature of belief neutrality, but analyzes a single agent's decision problem rather than evaluating the welfare of many decision makers, each with a di¤erent (but single) belief distribution.
Our belief-neutral welfare criterion is designed to detect ine¢ ciencies (or e¢ ciencies) associated with negative-sum (or positive-sum) speculation between agents. We emphasize that this criterion is not suited for analyzing e¢ ciencies induced by irrational behavior of an individual agent. Consider an agent who invests a large fraction of her wealth in her own company's stock. This investment decision may appear ine¢ cient to a conscientious observer who holds a more neutral view of the company's stock than the agent and who thus believes the agent should diversify her investment away from the company. However, the decision is optimal under the agent's beliefs. Without taking a stand on the beliefs of the agent and the observer, our criterion cannot identify the agent's investment decision as e¢ cient or ine¢ cient in isolation.
On the other hand, in an equilibrium context, when one group of agents hold di¤erent beliefs than another group due to belief distortions, the trading between the two groups can make their consumption excessively volatile (as we will discuss in Section 3.4). Our criterion can identify the negative sum in expected utilities induced by trading without ruling a particular group's choice as ine¢ cient.
An Alternative Criterion
It is useful to compare our criterion to the rationalizable Pareto dominance criterion of Gilboa, Samuelson, and Schmeidler (2012) . They propose to extend the Pareto criterion in the presence of heterogeneous subjective beliefs by de…ning a choice x to dominate another choice y based on two conditions: First, each agent's expected utility under her own beliefs from x is higher than or equal to that from y, which is the standard Pareto condition. Second, there exists at least one set of beliefs, under which the expected utility of any agent from x is higher than or equal to that from y. This second condition is additional and requires a set of common beliefs to rationalize the e¢ ciency of x:
The additional condition is able to prevent the bet between Joe and Bob from being e¢ cient as no common belief can rationalize the bet. However, the additional condition also makes the criterion more incomplete than the standard Pareto criterion. As a result, the rationalizable Pareto dominance criterion cannot …nd the bet as being more ine¢ cient than no betting, or vice versa.
Our criterion builds on the premise that in the presence of distorted beliefs, the planner should ignore agents'expected utilities under their own, possibly distorted, beliefs and instead use a common probability measure to evaluate their welfare. The use of a common probability measure is analogous to the additional condition imposed by Gilboa, Samuelson, and Schmeidler. In contrast, our criterion also requires the planner to vary the common measure across a large set of reasonable measures so that the resulting welfare ranking is belief neutral. Despite this seemingly restrictive belief-neutral requirement, our criterion is able to identify positive and negative externalities in the bet between Joe and Bob, as well as in many other examples discussed in the next section.
Examples
This section provides a series of examples to demonstrate that, despite its incompleteness, the simple welfare criterion we propose can produce surprisingly sharp welfare ranking in a wide range of prominent economic models with heterogeneously distorted beliefs. The key is that the externality induced by con ‡icting beliefs in these models is often uniformly positive or negative across di¤erent beliefs. In the example of the bet between Joe and Bob, the negative externality is re ‡ected by the destroyed pillow. More generally, similar negative externalities can emerge through overinvestments, bankruptcy costs, excessive risk taking, and distorted consumption/savings decisions, while positive externalities can arise from overcoming market breakdowns induced by adverse selection. This section uses simpli…ed variants of well-known models to illustrate these di¤erent sources of externalities, and demonstrates that our welfare criterion provides clear welfare ranking in each case. As these examples tend to be one sided, one should not overinterpret our analysis as advocating any policy recommendation, which would require considerations of many other important and realistic features ignored in these examples. 
Overinvestments in Bubble Models
A segment of the literature emphasizes that when short sales are constrained, heterogeneous beliefs can lead to price bubbles as asset owners anticipate reselling their assets to other more optimistic agents in the future (e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978) , Morris (1996), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , Wu and Guo (2004) , Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) , and Hong and Sraer (2011) ). In these models, heterogeneous beliefs induce risk-neutral agents not only to trade against each other but also to overvalue assets. Overvaluation does not reduce social welfare by itself as it is simply a welfare transfer across agents. However, overvaluation of equity can lead to …rms' overinvestments (e.g., Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) , Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) , and Panageas (2006)), which reduce the total welfare of all investors. Our criterion can identify overinvestments independent of the belief used to evaluate …rms'fundamental values.
We focus on a simple binomial setting with three dates (i.e., t = 0; 1; 2) and two riskneutral agents (A and B). These agents trade the equity issued by a …rm. The …rm chooses its investment at date 0. Suppose that the …rm's investment is cost free but the investment return has a decreasing return to scale. If the …rm chooses to establish a production capacity of n units, the dollar return to per unit of capacity is determined by a binomial tree depicted in Figure 1 . There are three possible states (uu, ud, and dd) on t = 2: Suppose that the return per unit across the states on date 2 is e R = fD uu ; D ud ; D dd g = fR + 1 n; R n; R 1 ng ;
where R > 1 is a constant. Due to the …rm's decreasing return to scale, a larger investment scale n reduces the per unit return by n across all states on date 2. Suppose that the …rm issues one share of equity for each unit of production capacity. The shares are equally distributed to A and B:
Before analyzing the …rm's investment decision, we …rst examine the market price of each share of equity. Figure 1 depicts the dynamics of the two agents'beliefs. We assume that the two agents have time-varying beliefs: they start with the same beliefs on date 0 but hold di¤erent beliefs on date 1: 
In particular, agent A becomes more optimistic than agent B in state u of date 1 and less optimistic in state d. The parameter > 0 determines the two agents'belief dispersion in both states u and d: It is straightforward to verify that at t = 0 the two agents share the same expectation of the asset's …nal payo¤:
Following this literature, we assume that short-sale of the equity is not allowed. Then, the ‡uctuations of the two agents'beliefs at t = 1 give an asset owner, who can be either A or B, an option to resell his holding to the other agent; more speci…cally, for agent A to sell to agent B in state d and for agent B to sell to agent A in state u: To obtain a bubble, we assume that each agent has su¢ cient cash to acquire the asset so that the competitive price is determined by the buyer's reservation value. It is straightforward to derive the following market price in state u: p u = R + 1=2 + n; which is paid by agent A, and in state d:
which is paid by agent B. By backward induction, both agents on date 0 value the asset by p 0 = R + =2 n: Despite that each agent's expectation of the asset payo¤ is R n, their valuation of the asset is R + =2 n. The di¤erence is driven by the resale option, i.e., the speculative motive to resell the asset to the other agent at a price higher than his own valuation on date 1. This resale option contributes a non-fundamental component to asset prices in the aforementioned bubble models.
We now analyze the …rm's investment decision. Suppose that the …rm chooses its production capacity, n, to maximize its market value given by: n p 0 = n (R n + =2) : Thus, the …rm's optimal investment level is given by: n = 1 2 R + 2 1 ; which depends on , the magnitude of the two agents'belief dispersion on date 1.
Is this investment decision socially e¢ cient? Suppose the planner uses the utilitarian social welfare function along with a convex combination of the two agents' beliefs, h = h A + (1 h) B , 8h 2 (0; 1). Since both A and B are risk neutral, the expected utilitarian social welfare is equal to the …rm's expected …nal payo¤, given by:
This expression is maximized by choosing n = 1 2 (R 1) < n : This implies that the …rm overinvests in the market equilibrium relative to the level that maximizes the expected utilitarian social welfare (or the …rm's long-run fundamental value) under any convex combination of the agents'beliefs.
12
This result does not need to rely on any social welfare function because the market equilibrium is in fact belief-neutral Pareto ine¢ cient. In particular, it can be checked that for any reasonable belief, h , the market equilibrium with investment level n is Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation with investment n < n combined with some initial
The driving force behind the ine¢ cient overinvestment is exactly the value of the resale option in the …rm's date-0 market valuation. Anticipating the possibility of reselling the share to the other agent at date 1 at a pro…t, each agent overvalues the share at date 0 relative to his own expectation of the share's long-run fundamental value. This, in turn, induces the …rm to overinvest. Note that each agent recognizes that this level of investment reduces the …rm's long-run value. However, each agent also thinks that these losses will be borne by the other agent. A negative externality emerges just like in the bet between Joe and Bob. Consistent with this overinvestment example, Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) provide evidence that …rms tend to increase investment in response to increased heterogeneous beliefs proxied by dispersion in analysts'earnings forecasts.
Bene…ts of Speculation in Lemons Models
The previous example shows that overinvestment in heterogeneous-beliefs-induced bubble models leads to belief-neutral welfare losses. However, speculation and bubbles induced by heterogeneously distorted beliefs can also be bene…cial. Among other things, bubbles help overcome market breakdown in "lemons" models caused by adverse selection (as in 12 Given the presence of the …rm's investment decision, it is important to restrict the set of reasonable beliefs to the convex combinations of agents' beliefs. This is because a measure outside the convex combinations of agents'beliefs would imply that the agents'aggregate belief is biased and thus rule the …rm's investment decision in the equilibrium as ine¢ cient even in the absence of any belief dispersion between the two agents. As stated previously, analyzing ine¢ ciencies associated with the agents'aggregate biases is not our focus. Akerlof (1970) ). This subsection presents an example to illustrate this point by introducing heterogeneous beliefs into a recent model of Tirole (2012) . Also see Morris (1994) The model of Tirole (2012) considers a …rm that attempts to …nance a new investment project by selling its legacy asset. However, the …rm is asymmetrically informed about the payo¤ from the legacy asset, which creates a lemons problem. As in Akerlof (1970) , the equilibrium features a low price and reduced trade, and in some extreme cases, complete market breakdown. We show that bubbles induced by heterogeneous beliefs mitigate the lemons problem by allowing the …rm to sell its asset and invest in the new project even if the quality of its legacy asset is relatively high. Our criterion can detect the consequent welfare gain.
Consider a seller that has access to a new project that costs I and generates a payo¤ of I + G. The payo¤ of the project is not pledgeable (that is, it accrues to the seller but cannot be promised to others.) Thus, the seller needs to …nance the project by selling a legacy asset which is pledgeable. This asset returns R with probability , and 0 otherwise. The probability, , itself is uniformly distributed over [0; 1]. The prior value of the pledgeable asset exceeds the investment cost, p prior R 2 > I, so that the project is always …nanced in a constrained e¢ cient allocation.
The key friction is that the seller is asymmetrically informed about the success probability of the legacy asset. In particular, the seller receives a signal and fully learns , while potential buyers continue to believe that is distributed according to the uniform prior. The rest of the section analyzes the e¤ect of this friction on the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation with and without heterogeneous beliefs. Suppose also that G < R 2
, which rules out the extreme case in which the seller is always able to …nance the project despite having asymmetric information.
First, consider the benchmark without heterogeneous beliefs among potential buyers. Let p denote the equilibrium asset price. If p < I, then there is no trade because the seller is unable to …nance the new project by selling the legacy asset. If p > I, then a trade is possible. In particular, the seller will sell the asset only if R p + G. In a competitive equilibrium, the buyer breaks even, which implies p = RE j p +G R . Solving this further gives the equilibrium price p = G. It follows that there is no trade when G < G = I. When G G , the seller with < sells the asset at a price p , where
In particular, the adverse selection induced by the asymmetric information between buyers and the seller reduces the level of asset trading and the asset price. Intuitively, sellers with low quality assets ("lemons") exert a negative externality on sellers with higher quality assets.
In some cases (i.e., G < I), there is a complete market breakdown.
To formally discuss social welfare, consider (as in Tirole, 2012 ) the ex-ante utilitarian social welfare function, i.e., the sum of the seller's and buyer's expected utilities under the prior distribution for . Since the trading pro…ts represent a pure transfer between the seller and buyers, the ex-ante social welfare is simply
Here, I fG>G ; < g is an indicator function for whether the seller manages to invest in the project, and the inequality follows since there is investment with probability strictly less than 1. In contrast, an alternative (feasible) allocation that always transfers the asset from the seller to the buyer at price p prior ensures that the project is always …nanced and the social welfare is R 2 + G. Hence, the competitive equilibrium is (constrained) Pareto ine¢ cient.
Next, we consider the case of buyers holding heterogeneous beliefs regarding the asset return. Suppose that the asset return in the event of success is random and independent of the asset's success. We denote it by e R and assume that it can take two possible values R + 1 and R 1: The seller believes the probability of e R = R + 1 is 0:5. There are two groups of risk-neutral buyers for the asset. One group believes the probability of e R = R + 1 is 1, while the other group believes the probability is 0: Suppose that no one can short sell the asset and each group has su¢ cient cash to acquire the asset. Like the previous example, buyers in the optimistic group acquire the asset and bid up the asset price to their expectation of the asset payo¤. A key feature of the model is that the asset overvaluation induced by agents' heterogeneous beliefs (as in Miller, 1977) helps to overcome the lemons problem. To see this most starkly, suppose G > . At this price, the seller in turn …nds it optimal to sell because R R < p + G, where the last inequality follows since
. Consequently, unlike the earlier case, (for the same parameters) the competitive equilibrium with belief heterogeneity features trade and investment with probability 1.
We can apply our welfare criterion to show that the equilibrium with belief heterogeneity is in fact belief-neutral e¢ cient. To see this, let h denote a probability measure, which assigns probability h 2 [0; 1] to e R = R + 1 and which is a convex combination of all buyers'
beliefs. The ex-ante social welfare under this belief can be written as:
since the project is invested with probability 1. As this expression illustrates, regardless of the probability measure, the ex-ante welfare is at its highest possible level. This is because there is no disagreement about G, the gains from undertaking the project. This in turn implies that the equilibrium is belief-neutral e¢ cient. Thus, speculation induced by heterogeneous beliefs mitigates the lemons problem and leads to belief-neutral welfare gains.
Bankruptcy Costs in Leverage Cycle Models
The literature on leverage cycles based on agents'heterogeneous beliefs (e.g., Geanakoplos Consider a setting with 3 dates, i.e., t = 0; 1; 2, and two types of risk-neutral agents (A and B). Figure 2 depicts the asset payo¤ and the beliefs of the two types. Suppose that the …nal payo¤ of a risky asset across the three …nal states at date 2 is e R = f1; 1; g, where 2 (0; 1).
The asset gives a low payo¤ of after two negative fundamental moves and gives 1 in other …nal states. We normalize the net supply of the asset to one unit and the risk-free interest rate to zero. Each type holds a constant belief about the probability of the fundamental state rising on the tree in the following period. We denote the two groups'beliefs by A 2 (0; 1) and B 2 (0; 1) with A > B . A key feature of this setting is that the speci…ed payo¤ and belief structures lead to an increased divergence in the agents' fundamental expectations about the asset payo¤ in the lower state d of date 1; which eventually triggers a leverage cycle.
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Suppose that the pessimists (type-B agents) initially own all of the asset at t = 0: It is desirable for the optimists (type-A agents) to acquire all of the assets. However, they face a practical problem in that they may not have su¢ cient cash endowments to make the purchases. To highlight this problem, we assume that there is one unit of optimists, each with an initial cash endowment of c > 0: They can use asset holdings as collateral to raise debt …nancing. If a borrower is unable to make the promised debt payment, the creditor can seize the collateral. This in turn makes the availability and cost of the borrower's debt …nancing dependent on the future value of the collateral. On the other hand, the availability of debt …nancing directly determines how much the optimists can bid up the asset price beyond the pessimists'asset valuation.
In deciding how much to borrow, type-A agents face two sources of costs. First, as the creditors (likely type-B agents) are more concerned about the potential default risk than the borrowers, higher leverage tends to be more costly. Second, if a type-A agent defaults on the debt and is forced to sell his asset on either date 1 or 2, he faces a personal liquidation cost, . One can interpret this cost as the inconvenience cost of vacating a house, which is incurred by the borrower. At the end of this subsection, we also describe a version of the model in which costs are incurred by the creditor when the borrower defaults. These two versions have similar welfare implications.
Our setting maintains several key features used by Geanakoplos (2009) , including the same binomial payo¤ structure and the same collateralized debt contract. We add liquidation costs, which is a realistic feature, and one that was especially relevant during the recent subprime mortgage crisis. Since this feature complicates the analysis, we allow for only two types of beliefs rather than a continuum. The model derivation follows He and Xiong (2012) , who analyze equilibrium debt …nancing in a setting with two types of agents whose beliefs vary over time, but without liquidation costs.
There are two relevant debt contracts in equilibrium. One contract promises a payment of at date 1 collateralized by one unit of the asset. Because the asset's fundamental value in the worst state of date 2 is able to cover , this debt contract is riskless throughout and can thus give the borrower an initial credit of . The second contract promises a payment on date 1 equal to type-B agents'(the creditors') asset valuation in state d of date 1:
As the creditors value the collateral for at least K d on date 1, this debt is also riskless and allows a borrower to borrow at the risk-free interest rate for the initial period. However, to re…nance this debt in state d of date 1, the borrower has to make a greater promise of paying 1 at date 2. This new promise allows him to raise K d from type-B agents to pay o¤ his initial debt, but exposes him to the risk of defaulting and being forced to liquidate the asset if the asset's fundamental value eventually turns out to be on date 2. Relative to the …rst contract, the second one gives higher leverage at the expense of a higher re…nancing cost in state d of date 1 as well as the possibility of incurring the liquidation cost on date 2.
We prove in the appendix that these two debt choices dominate the other alternatives.
We assume that the liquidation cost, , is modest so that in some scenarios the type-A agents will choose the higher leverage (i.e., the contract with promise K d ) and thus face the liquidation risk:
Under this assumption, the analysis in the appendix shows that there is a price threshold Appendix A.1 characterizes the equilibrium in …ve di¤erent cases based on type-A agents' initial cash c: We are particularly interested in three cases, in which c is su¢ ciently low so that at least some of type-A agents choose to …nance their asset purchases by using the high-leverage debt with promise K d . This debt …nancing exposes them to the liquidation cost on date 2. They make this choice purely for speculative reasons-because they perceive the asset to be signi…cantly underpriced,
We next apply our welfare criterion to illustrate that this equilibrium is indeed ine¢ cient.
To see this, …rst suppose the planner has the utilitarian welfare function. We use a convex combination of the two types' beliefs,
welfare. The risk neutrality of both types of agents implies that the social welfare is given by the asset's expected fundamental value plus optimists'cash, c, and minus the expected liquidation costs, which amount to
where is the fraction of type-A agents using high-leverage K d debt contract and IR = denotes the indicator function for the realization of the stateR = . Since both type-A and type-B agents assign a positive probability to this state, the social welfare is lower than that of the status quo allocation with no asset trading:
Thus, our criterion identi…es, regardless of the beliefs, a strict welfare loss in these cases due to the liquidation costs incurred by the borrowers. 14 As before, this result holds for any welfare function because the equilibrium is also belief-neutral Pareto ine¢ cient.
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14 The welfare loss is present even if the planner adopts a belief measure outside of the convex combinations of the two agents'beliefs, as long as the measure assigns a positive probability to the state e R = : 15 As an alternative, we brie ‡y describe a setting in which bankruptcy costs are borne by creditors instead of borrowers. This alternative setting follows that of Simsek (2012) . Suppose there are only two dates, t 2 f0; 1g, but three states, fH; M; Lg, in which the asset price will be either high, medium, or low. The agents agree about the probability of the low payo¤ state, L , but disagree about the probabilities of the remaining states. In particular, type-A agents are more optimistic about the high state, i.e., In more general settings, agents acquire assets not just for speculative purposes but also for consumption. For example, people buy houses not only because they expect housing prices to appreciate but also because they enjoy living in their house. It is important to incorporate both speculative incentives and consumption values in evaluating the welfare consequences of leverage cycles. Our criterion provides a useful tool for such an evaluation.
Excessive Risk Taking in Speculative Trading Models
A large class of economic models analyzes trading between agents who hold heterogeneous beliefs regarding economic fundamentals and the impact of their trading on equilibrium asset price dynamics (e.g., Detemple and Murthy (1994) , Kurz (1996) , Zapatero (1998) , Basak (2000) , Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) , Jouini and Napp (2007) , David (2008) , Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), Xiong and Yan (2010) , and Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela (2011)).
A key insight of these models is that trading induced by heterogeneous beliefs can lead to endogenous ‡uctuations in agents'wealth distribution, which, in turn, ampli…es asset price volatility and induces time-varying risk premia. More speci…cally, a positive shock increases the wealth of optimists more than that of pessimists, as optimists tend to take larger asset positions. The optimists'greater wealth increases allow them to take even larger positions and thus ampli…es the impact of the shock on equilibrium asset prices.
Despite the capability of these models for capturing important dynamics of asset prices and risk premia, researchers tend to avoid making any welfare statement due to the lack of a well-speci…ed welfare criterion. Our simple criterion can potentially …ll this gap by o¤ering a useful insight for these types of models. Under the premise stated earlier that agents hold heterogeneously distorted beliefs, the resulting trading makes agents'consumption excessively risky. Each agent takes these risks because she expects to earn high returns in expectation. However, each agent also recognizes that these returns will come from other agents with di¤erent beliefs. Thus, when agents are risk averse, trading makes consumption Suppose a fraction, 2 (0; 1), of the value of the asset is lost in a foreclosure, which is the main di¤erence from the earlier setting. In this case, it can be seen that type-A agents face a trade-o¤ between choosing a safe debt contract with face value L, and a risky debt contract with face value M . The risky debt enables them to borrow a larger amount, L (1 ) L + (1 L ) M , but is also expensive (i.e., it has a high yield). This is because it leads to bankruptcy costs in some states. As before, under appropriate conditions, the speculative motive induces type-A agents to …nance their purchases with the risky debt. This arrangement generates expected bankruptcy costs according to any reasonable belief measure, and is thus belief-neutral ine¢ cient. of all agents more volatile and is thus a negative-sum game in expected utility terms under any convex combination of their beliefs.
We consider a one-period, endowment economy setting with two agents, A and B, to illustrate the welfare implication (although this static setting is insu¢ cient to highlight the rich asset pricing implications of the aforementioned studies). Each agent is endowed with half dollars and lives from t = 0 to t = 1. There is neither aggregate nor idiosyncratic endowment risk. Suppose that each agent consumes at t = 1 and has an increasing and strictly concave utility function u (c i ). The two agents hold heterogeneous beliefs about a random variable, say e D, which can take two possible values, either H or L. One may interpret this random variable as sunspot, which is independent of the agents'endowment risk. Suppose agent A assigns a probability of A 2 (0; 1) to state e D = H, while agent B assigns B 2 (0; 1). The di¤erence in beliefs causes the agents to engage in speculative trades against each other. We allow them to trade a contract that pays
Suppose that the contract is traded at a price of p at t = 0: Agent i (i 2 fA; Bg) chooses k i , the number of contracts necessary to maximize his expected utility:
The …rst order condition gives:
The market clearing condition requires that:
The standard results hold that there is a market equilibrium allocation, k A ; k B ; p , which solves each agent's optimality condition and the market clearing condition.
The market equilibrium in this example is ine¢ cient according to our criterion. To see this, …rst consider the welfare-function version of the criterion. Suppose the planner has a utilitarian welfare function:
We compare the social welfare based on the agents'equilibrium consumption:
with that based on the status quo allocation: y = f(y i H ; y i L ) (0:5; 0:5)g i2fA;Bg : According to our criterion, the planner considers any probability measure that lies between agents' belief measures. In fact, for this example this set can be extended to include any measure that assigns a probability 2 (0; 1) to state e D = H. The following proposition establishes a belief-neutral welfare ranking.
Proposition 2 If
A 6 = B and the social planner has the utilitarian welfare function, then the status quo allocation is belief-neutral superior to the market equilibrium allocation.
The mechanism that underlies Proposition 2 is simply that the trade makes agents' consumption riskier than their endowments. Due to risk aversion, the utilitarian social welfare falls according to each agent's belief, as well as any belief that assigns a positive probability to both states. One should be cautious not to overinterpret this example to mean that trading always reduces social welfare. Richer economic settings often feature a trade-o¤ between welfareenhancing risk sharing and speculation. To illustrate this trade-o¤, consider a variant of the earlier example in which there is also a risk-sharing motive for trading. In particular, suppose the random variable, e D, also a¤ects agents'endowment risks. One may interpret this random variable as corresponding to a relative price shock (e.g., the price of corn) that leads to a reallocation of wealth between agents. In particular, if e D = H, then agent A (e.g., the miller) incurs a loss of e, while agent B (e.g., the farmer) incurs a gain of e. If e D = L then the endowments are as before. Thus, the status quo allocation is now given by:
= f(0:5 e; 0:5) ; (0:5 + e; 0:5)g .
The equilibrium is characterized by the following …rst order condition for agent A, Unlike the setting of Proposition 2, it is now not optimal to prevent trading completely.
Rather, the planner would like to prevent speculative trading, that is, trading in excess of the optimal risk-sharing benchmark. While this example is stylized, the point applies more generally. Consider an endowment economy with complete …nancial markets in which agents have the same preferences, assumed to be separable over time and states, but potentially distorted beliefs. Regardless of the belief measure used by the planner, a Pareto e¢ cient allocation is characterized by the equalization of agents'marginal utilities across states, that is,
for each pair of agents, fA; Bg, and states fH; Lg (along with the resource constraints). Hence, in these settings, the set of belief-neutral e¢ cient allocations is always non-empty, and every such allocation features full risk sharing. In contrast, the equilibrium allocation features the equalization of agents'marginal utilities multiplied by their distorted beliefs, e.g.,
. 16 Thus, whenever agents disagree about the relative probabilities of some states H and L, speculative trading causes deviations from full risk sharing, which is ine¢ cient regardless of the planner's belief measure.
In standard asset pricing theories (e.g., the capital asset pricing model) risk sharing requires investors to hold highly diversi…ed portfolios. However, empirical evidence suggests that many individual investors fail to diversify adequately (see Barber and Odean, 2011 , for a recent survey). They tend to overinvest in domestic stocks (French and Poterba, 1991) , as well as regionally close and familiar stocks (Huberman, 2001, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001 ).
In more direct con ‡ict with risk sharing, they also tend to invest considerably in own company stocks (Benartzi, 2001 , Poterba, 2003 , Doskeland and Hvide, 2011 and professionally close stocks. Our criterion, along with Proposition 4, creates a presumption under an equilibrium context that these investments (or similar departures from risk sharing) might be socially ine¢ cient.
The analysis so far assumes that the planner is su¢ ciently informed about the nature of agents' endowment risks. In some contexts, e.g., derivatives trading by …rms, the planner might not be as precisely informed as agents about their endowment risks. As a result, it might be di¢ cult for the planner to implement the optimal risk-sharing allocation. Instead, the planner's options might be either to allow unrestricted trading in the risky asset or to prevent trading completely. Since the gain from risk sharing increases with the magnitude of the agents'endowment shocks, e, our next result shows that the planner would prefer no trading as long as e is su¢ ciently small.
Proposition 5 If
A 6 = B and e < e, where e > 0 is a threshold that depends on A and B , then, for any measure with 2 (0; 1), the market equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the no-trade status quo allocation with some transfer T 2 [ 0:5; 0:5].
As this proposition illustrates, our welfare criterion can also detect the ine¢ ciency in the presence of a trade-o¤ between risk sharing and speculation. Simsek (2011) and Kubler and Schmedders (2011) analyze richer settings that feature a similar trade-o¤. Our welfare criterion is useful to analyze the ine¢ ciency of speculative trading in these richer settings.
Consumption/Savings Distortions in Macro Models
In macroeconomic models, belief disagreements can also distort aggregate investment through individuals'consumption/savings decision, e.g., Sims (2008) . Belief disagreements cause individuals to perceive greater expected returns from their investments. This a¤ects their savings decision in the same way an increase in the real interest rate does. It creates not only a substitution e¤ect, which tends to increase savings, but also an income e¤ect, which tends to increase current consumption and thus reduce savings. Depending on which e¤ect dominates, individuals might save too much or too little relative to a homogeneous-beliefs benchmark. The net saving in turn leads to over-or under-investment. Our criterion can help detect these types of ine¢ ciencies.
As the setting used by Sims is simple enough, we adopt it in full. The setting has two dates, f0; 1g, and two types of agents, i 2 fA; Bg. We normalize the size of the population to one. Each agent starts with an endowment of b 0 dollars of nominal bonds issued by the government and an endowment of y units of goods. At the initial date, he can consume part of the goods'endowment and invest the rest either in the nominal bonds or in a real asset.
At date 1, there are two possible states of the world, s 2 ff; mg. In state s; the government …xes the state-dependent lump-sum tax on each agent to be s and the gross nominal interest rate to be R. In state f; the tax backing for bonds is low and hence prices are high, while in state m; taxes are high and prices are therefore lower. Thus, the government's budget constraints determine the bond price:
; where s 2 ff; mg :
The economy has a representative …rm, which produces at date 1 according to a decreasing return to scale production function:
, where k is the capital input and a is a constant. The …rm has to rent capital from individual agents at a market rental rate of . We normalize the …rm's ownership to one share, which is equally divided among the agents. Thus, the …rm's pro…t per unit of ownership is = ak 1 k: The …rm's pro…t optimization requires that = a (1 ) k :
Type i 2 fA; Bg agents believe that the probability of state f is i 2 (0; 1). Each type contributes to half of the population. Each agent maximizes his aggregate utility across the two dates: 
Note that the agent can take a short position in the capital, which is equivalent to borrowing in real terms at a rate of . He can also take a short position in the nominal bonds, which is equivalent to borrowing in nominal terms at a rate of R: His consumption in state s is given with as the rate of relative risk aversion.
The …rst order condition for the agent with respect to k i gives
; i 2 fa; bg and with respect to b i gives
The market clearing condition for the capital gives k = k A + k B and for the nominal bonds
These conditions allow us to determine a unique equilibrium represented
While analytical solution of the equilibrium is not available, it is numerically tractable.
We adopt the same parameter values used by Sims to illustrate the equilibrium: , and can be calculated as 6:77. For the homogeneous-beliefs setting, the utilitarian social welfare is similarly independent of and can be calculated as 6:98. Hence, the presence of heterogeneous beliefs reduces the expected social welfare regardless of the belief measure one uses to evaluate the agents'expected utilities. As before, this result holds for any welfare function because the market equilibrium is in fact belief-neutral Pareto ine¢ cient. Thus, our criterion is able to give clear welfare ranking in a macro setting with distortions induced by heterogeneous beliefs.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a belief-neutral welfare criterion for models in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. The criterion builds on the premise that a planner is aware of belief distortions by some agents but cannot di¤erentiate whose beliefs are distorted.
The criterion rules that an allocation is belief-neutral e¢ cient (ine¢ cient) if it is e¢ cient (ine¢ cient) under any convex combination of the agents' beliefs. We can implement this criterion either through a given social welfare function or the notion of Pareto e¢ ciency.
While this criterion gives incomplete welfare ranking, it is nevertheless useful in identifying negative-sum or positive-sum speculation. Through a series of examples, we show that this criterion is capable of identifying welfare gains/losses in a wide range of prominent models with heterogeneously distorted beliefs.
Appendix A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Characterization of Equilibrium in Section 3.3
The following proposition summarizes the market equilibrium:
Proposition 6 Depending on type-A agents'cash endowment c, the following …ve cases can emerge in equilibrium.
Case 1: c < c 1 , where
In this case, type-A agents acquire the asset at t = 0 by using a one-period debt contract with a promise of K d . However, their purchasing capacity is insu¢ cient to lift the asset price, p 0 , above type-B agents' expectation of the asset's fundamental value. Consequently,
Case 2: c 2 [c 1 ; c 2 ), where c 2 = p 0 K d and
In this case, type-A agents acquire the asset at t = 0 by using one-period debt contract with a promise of K d . The asset price p 0 is given by type-A agents'aggregate purchasing capacity:
Case 3 
. In this case, type-A agents have ample cash endowments to support their asset acquisition at a price equal to their expectation of the asset's fundamental value,
, by using debt with a promised payment less than .
We prove this proposition in two steps. First, we characterize type-A agents' optimal debt contract. We show that the relevant debt contracts are short-term debt with face value and K d , and we characterize the choice between these two contracts. Second, we consider market clearing and characterize the equilibrium price for cases 1-5. In each case, we also show that (unlike in Geanakoplos, 2009) type-A agents do not have an incentive to hold cash to buy assets in state d of date 1. In particular, type-A agents use all of their purchasing power to buy the assets at date 0.
Step 1. First consider type-A agents'debt contract choice. We start with short-term debt with maturity at t = 1: It can be seen that the face value of short-term debt should lie in the range of [ , 1], i.e., between the two possible payo¤s of the collateral. If the agent chooses to borrow short-term debt at t = 0, he has to roll over his debt at t = 1: If he fails to obtain re…nancing, he will default and incur a personal liquidation cost of : In state u, the subsequent asset payo¤ is surely 1; thus there is no problem rolling over the debt. In state d, the maximum debt …nancing the borrower can obtain from the pessimistic creditors is
Thus, the borrower is able to structure a new debt contract with creditors if his initial debt promise is not higher than K d . By making a new promise of F d , he can obtain the following credit to repay his initial debt:
Note that the new debt is risk-free if F d or risky if < F d 1. In the latter case, the lender will be paid with F d in the good du state but receive the asset in the bad dd state.
Thus, if the borrower's initial debt promiseF 0 is lower than or equal to K d ; he can obtain re…nancing even in the lower state d at t = 1; and if F 0 is higher than K d , he will have to default in the lower state d:
We now discuss the borrower's debt promise choice in using short-term debt. First consider the range,
If the borrower promises F 0 = , he can obtain an initial credit of , which allows him to establish an initial position of c= (p 0 ) units of asset. The expected return on his cash is
If he chooses a promise F 0 2 ( , K d ], he can obtain an initial credit of F 0 . The expected return on his cash after accounting for the possible liquidation cost is
Note that while he can re…nance his initial debt in state d on date 1; he will eventually default in state dd on date 2: It is straightforward to verify that
Thus, if p 0 > e p 0 , F 0 = is the optimal choice. If p 0 = e p 0 , any F 0 2 ( , K d ] would yield the same expected return. If p 0 < e p 0 , F 0 = K d is superior to any promise in ( , K d ). But we still need to compare this choice with F 0 = debt. Suppose that at a critical level p 0 , the expected returns from F 0 = and K d are equal:
which gives
Therefore, if p 0 < p 0 , F 0 = K d is the optimal face value; if p 0 > p 0 , F 0 = dominates; when p 0 = p 0 , the borrower is indi¤erent between F 0 = K d and .
We now consider short-term debt with a promise higher than K d . For such a choice, the debt is no longer riskless as the borrower cannot re…nance it in state d on date 1 and has to turn over the asset to the creditor. Anticipating this possibility, the creditor is willing to grant the following credit on date 0:
Then, the expected return to the borrower is
It is straightforward to verify that
Note that the asset price p 0 is bounded from below by the asset valuation of pessimists
As E B 0 [ e R] > p 0 , it is not optimal for the borrower to choose a debt promise above K d :
It is also straightforward to verify that under condition (2), p 0 > E B 0 [ e R]. Therefore, the borrower's optimal short-term debt promise at t = 0 is F 0 = Step 2. We now discuss di¤erent cases based on group-A agents'cash endowment c from high to low, in reverse order from those cases listed in Proposition 6
Case 5: c c 4 :
In this case, the asset price is determined by type-A agents'beliefs at each date. Moreover, at these prices, type-A agents are able to …nance their asset acquisition by using debt with a promise less than . In fact, each type-A agent is indi¤erent between acquiring or not acquiring the asset. To ensure this case holds true, c has to satisfy In this case, type-A agents use debt with promise to …nance their asset acquisition.
However, their aggregate purchasing power is unable to sustain the price at their asset valuation. Instead, at t = 0; the price is determined by their purchasing power:
Going forward, in state d of date 1; type-A agents can still re…nance their debt and thus keep the asset price at their valuation, i.e.,
To ensure that optimists' debt contract choice is optimal, we need to ensure that p 0 > p 0 , which is equivalent to c > c 3 p 0 :
We next check type-A agents'incentive to save cash to date 1 in this case. First consider their return from buying at date 0 (and holding until date 2), which is given by:
where the inequality follows since p 0 2 [p 0 , E A 0 [ e R]). If instead they save cash to date 1, they will have to buy the asset from other type-A agents (since these agents hold all the assets in the conjectured equilibrium). In view of liquidation costs, other type-A agents would sell at a price E A d [ e R] + . Thus, the return from saving cash is given by:
Thus, type-A agents have no incentive to save cash.
Case 3: c 2 c < c 3 .
In this case, type-A agents are indi¤erent to using debt with promises of and K d to purchase asset at price p 0 . The expected return is
where the equality follows from the de…nition of p 0 in (4).
Next consider a type-A agent, which we refer to as an arbitrageur, and consider his incentive to save cash to date 1. If the state goes to u at t = 1, the arbitrageur cannot pro…t from his cash. If the state goes to d, he can potentially pro…t. He has three options. First, he could buy the asset from type-A agents who initially purchased with a debt contract with face value . To buy from these agents, the arbitrageurs would have to pay p liq d = +E A d [~ ] , which exceeds her valuation. Second, he could buy from type-A agents who initially purchased with a debt contract with face value K d . These agents are distressed in the sense that they have collateralized all of their asset in exchange for K d . At the same time, they incur a liquidation cost, , from selling the asset at date 1. If instead they wait until date 2, then they incur the liquidation cost only if state dd is realized. Thus, they would be willing to sell the asset to the arbitrageur at a price:
Third, instead of buying the asset, the arbitrageurs could also re…nance the debt contract of other optimists. This gives a payo¤ of K d . The expected return to holding cash at date t = 0 is:
This shows that taking an asset position at t = 0 dominates saving cash.
Next consider the fraction of optimists, , that uses debt with promise K d . By market clearing, is determined as the solution to:
(1 )
At the lower end of the region c 2 , = 0, i.e., all optimists use short-term debt with promise
Case 2: c 1 c < c 2 .
In this case, each optimist uses debt with promise K d to …nance his asset acquisition at t = 0, and the asset price is determined by the aggregate purchasing power of the optimists:
As the asset price is even lower than the previous case, the expected return to an optimist from taking a levered position with debt promise K d is at least A + (1 A )
A B . However, the expected return from saving cash is at most A + (1 A )
A B : Thus, there is no incentive for any optimist to save cash at t = 0.
Once the optimists'cash endowment drops to a critical level c 1 , the asset price becomes the pessimists'asset valuation:
. This determines c 1 :
Case 1: c < c 1 :
In this case, each optimist acquires the asset by using debt with promise K d , but his aggregate purchasing power is insu¢ cient to maintain a level above the pessimists'valuation.
The low price implies a high expected return, which makes it undesirable for any optimist to save cash at t = 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 6.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
First, we establish that if A 6 = B , the two agents will take a non-zero position in the contract. The …rst order condition implies that Thus, k A and k B cannot both be zero, which in turn implies that both are nonzero.
On the other hand, the status quo allocation combined with the optimal risk-sharing trade, k opt , gives each agent a constant consumption of 0:5. It follows that this allocation combined with an appropriate transfer, T , Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation, proving Proposition 4.
To prove Proposition 5, consider agents' certainty-equivalent wealth from the no-trade status quo allocation. This is found by solving:
u w A;st (e; ) = u (0:5 e) + (1 ) u (0:5) , u w B;st (e; ) = u (0:5 + e) + (1 ) u (0:5) .
Next note that, as e ! 0, the endowment risks in the status quo allocation disappear. Thus: Combining these two observations and using the continuity of the equilibrium allocation, it can be seen that there exists e < e such that P i2fA;Bg w i;eq (e; ) < P i2fA;Bg w i;st (e; ) for each e < e and 2 (0; 1). Thus, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto dominated by the notrade status quo allocation combined with an appropriate transfer, T , proving Proposition 5.
